A. Mitchell Polinsky
Identifiers
- Open LibraryOL958568A
Top Subjects
- United States (4)
- Law and economics (4)
- Fines (Penalties) -- Mathematical models (4)
- Liability (Law) (2)
- Punishment in crime deterrence -- Mathematical models (2)
- Imprisonment (2)
- Wealth (2)
Books by A. Mitchell Polinsky
Total count: 38
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Imperfect clubs, local public goods, and a pure theory of fiscal location1970-01-01
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Amenities and property values in a model of an urban areaHarvard Institute of Economic Research1975-01-01
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Notes on the symmetry of taxes and subsidies in pollution control.Harvard Instituteof Economic Research1976-01-01
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An empirical reconciliation of micro and grouped estimates of the demand for housingHarvard Institute of Economic Research1977-01-01
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The demand for housingan empirical postscript.Harvard Institute of Economic Research1977-01-01
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On the choice between property rules and liability rulesHarvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University1978-01-01
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Contribution and claim reduction among antitrust defendantsa policy analysisLaw and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto1980-01-01
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Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and market powerLaw and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto1982-01-01
An introduction to law and economicsLittle, Brown1983-01-01-
Pŏp kyŏngjehak immunCh'op'anKyŏngmunsa1984-01-01
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Legal error, litigation and the incentive to obey the lawHarvard Law School1988-01-01
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Enforcement costs and the optimal magnitude and probability of finesNational Bureau of Economic Research1990-01-01
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A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individualsNational Bureau of Economic Research1990-01-01
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A model of optimal fines for repeat offendersNational Bureau of Economic Research1991-01-01
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Decoupling liabilityoptimal incentives for care and litigationNational Bureau of Economic Research1991-01-01
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Optimal cleanup and liability after environmentally harmful dischargesProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1992-01-01
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Optimal cleanup and liability after environmentally harmful dischargesNational Bureau of Economic Research1992-01-01
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Should liability be based on the harm to the victim or the gain to the injurer?National Bureau of Economic Research1993-01-01
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Sanctioning frivolous suitsan economic analysisHarvard Law School1993-01-01
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Should liability be based on the harm to the victim or the gain to the injurer?Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1993-01-01
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On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrenceNational Bureau of Economic Research1997-01-01
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Punitive damagesan economic analysisHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrenceHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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The fairness of sanctionssome implications for optimal enforcement policyHarvard Law School1998-01-01
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The economic theory of public enforcement of lawNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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Corruption and optimal law enforcementNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observeNational Bureau of Economic Research2004-01-01
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The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservableNational Bureau of Economic Research2004-01-01
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Economics and liability for accidentsHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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A damage-revelation rationale for coupon remediesNational Bureau of Economic Research2005-01-01
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The theory of public enforcement of lawNational Bureau of Economic Research2005-01-01
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The theory of public enforcement of lawStanford Law School2005-01-01
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Economic analysis of lawHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of product risksHarvard Law School2006-01-01
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Legal origins and modern stock marketsHarvard Law School2006-01-01
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Handbook of Law and EconomicsElsevier Science & Technology Books2007-01-01
An introduction to law and economics4th ed.Aspen Publishers2011-01-01-
Introduction to Law and EconomicsWolters Kluwer Law & Business2018-01-01