Contributions

  • Angeletos, Marios. - Contributor
  • National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor

Publication

2005 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

0 words, Guess

Page Count

0 pages

Physical Format

Electronic resource

Identifiers

Classifications

  • LCCHB1

Description

"Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Subjects

Topics

EqualityMathematical modelsDistributive justicePolitical corruptionDecentralization in governmentEquality -- Mathematical modelsDistributive justice -- Mathematical models

Series Statement

  • NBER working paper series ;
  • working paper 11399
  • Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;
  • working paper no. 11399.

Links

Reader Reviews

No reviews yet for this book.

Be the first to share your thoughts!