Screening disability insurance applications

Description

"This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.

Subjects

Series Statement

• Discussion paper -- no. 1981
• Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 1981

Links

• http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=1981
• URL