Contributions

  • Wang, Neng. - Contributor
  • National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor

Publication

2007 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

17,500 words, Guess

Page Count

70 pages

Identifiers

Description

The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premium, and higher interest rate. Calibrating the model to the Korean economy reveals that perfecting investor protection increases the stock market's value by 22 percent, a gain for which outside shareholders are willing to pay 11 percent of their capital stock.

Subjects

Series Statement

  • NBER working paper series -- no. 13251.
  • Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13251.

Links

Other Editions

  • Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricingNational Bureau of Economic Research2007-01-01

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