Budget windows, sunsets, and fiscal control
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Author
Contributions
- National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor
Publication
2004 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2005615273
- Open LibraryOL3475842M
Classifications
- LCCHB1
Description
"Governments around the world have struggled to find the right method of controlling public spending and budget deficits. In recent years, the United States has evaluated policy changes using a ten-year budget window. The use of a multi-year window is intended to capture the future effects of policies, the notion being that a budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window's endpoint. But a budget window that is too long includes future years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless, and gives credit to fiscal burdens shifted to those whom the budget rules are supposed to protect. This suggests that there may be an "optimal" budget window, and seeking to understand its properties is one of this paper''s main objectives. Another objective is to understand a phenomenon that has grown in importance in U.S. legislation the "sunset." This paper argues that, with an appropriately designed budget window, the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions will evaporate, so that temporary provisions can be taken at face value. The analysis also has implications for how to account for long-term term budget commitments"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Subjects
Series Statement
- NBER working paper series ;
- working paper 10694
- Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;
- working paper no. 10694.
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