Why do politicians delegate?
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Author
Contributions
- Tabellini, Guido Enrico, 1956- - Contributor
- National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor
Publication
2005 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2005618490
- Open LibraryOL3478459M
Classifications
- LCCHB1
Description
"Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The answer is yes: politicians will delegate some policy tasks, though in general not those that would be socially optimal to delegate. In particular, politicians tend not to delegate coalition forming redistributive policies and policies that create large rents or effective campaign contributions. Instead they prefer to delegate risky policies to shift risk (and blame) on bureaucracies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Series Statement
- NBER working paper series ;
- working paper 11531
- Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;
- working paper no. 11531.
Other Editions
- Why do politicians delegate?
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