Lucian A. Bebchuk
Identifiers
- Open LibraryOL1452703A
Top Subjects
- United States (49)
- Consolidation and merger of corporations (18)
- Corporations (16)
- Law and legislation (14)
- Mathematical models (14)
- Corporate governance (12)
- Salaries (10)
Books by Lucian A. Bebchuk
Total count: 155
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An inquiry into the mechanism of the private law system1979-01-01
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The pursuit of a bigger piecan everyone expect a bigger slice?Hofstra University School of Law1980-01-01
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Litigation and settlement under imperfect informationLaw and Economics Program, Stanford Law School1983-01-01
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Towards an undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeoversProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1984-01-01
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Towards an undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeoversLaw and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto1984-01-01
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Towards an undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeovers1984-01-01
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A model of the outcome of takeover bidsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1985-01-01
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The case for facilitating competing tender offersthe last (?) replyHarvard Law School1986-01-01
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Suing solely to extract a settlement offerProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1986-01-01
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The sole owner standard for takeover policyProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1987-01-01
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Fairness opinions, how fair are they and what can be done about it?Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1988-01-01
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Takeover bids below the expected value of minority sharesProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1988-01-01
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A new approach to corporate reorganizationProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1988-01-01
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Freedom of contract and the corporationan essay on the mandatory role of corporate lawProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1988-01-01
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The debate on contractual freedom in corporate lawProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1989-01-01
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The effect of insider trading on insiders' reaction to opportunities to "waste" corporate valueProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1990-01-01
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Information and the scope of liability for breach of contractthe rule of Hadley v. BaxendaleProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1990-01-01
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The effects of insider trading on insiders' choice among risky investment projectsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1990-01-01
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Bargaining and the division of value in corporate reorganizationProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1990-01-01
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A framework for analyzing legal policy toward proxy contestsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1990-01-01
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The effects of insider trading on insiders' effort in good and bad timesProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1991-01-01
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The effects of Chapter 11 and debt renegotiation on ex ante corporate decisionsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1991-01-01
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Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehensionProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1991-01-01
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Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individualsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1991-01-01
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Do short-term managerial objectives lead to under- or over-investment in long-term projects?Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1991-01-01
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Bankruptcy rules, managerial entrenchment, and firm-specific human capitalHarvard Law School1992-01-01
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Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehensionNational Bureau of Economic Research1992-01-01
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Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individualsNational Bureau of Economic Research1992-01-01
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An analysis of fee-shifting based on the margin of victoryon frivolous suits, meritorious suits, and the role of rule 11Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1993-01-01
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Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate controlProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1993-01-01
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Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate controlNational Bureau of Economic Research1994-01-01
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An analysis of fee-shifting based on the margin of victoryon frivolous suits, meritorious suits, and the role of Rule 11National Bureau of Economic Research1994-01-01
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How would you like to pay for that?the strategic effects of contingent fees and retainer arrangements on settlement termsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1995-01-01
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On the credibility and success of threats to sueProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1995-01-01
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The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcyProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1995-01-01
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An economic analysis of transnational bankruptciesHarvard Law School1996-01-01
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Managerial value diversion and shareholder wealthHarvard Law School1996-01-01
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Damage measures for inadvertent breach of contractHarvard Law School1996-01-01
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The effect of fee-shifting rules on settlement termsHarvard Law School1996-01-01
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Corporate ownership structuresprivate versus social optimalityNational Bureau of Economic Research1996-01-01
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On divisibility and credibilitythe effects of the distribution of litigation costs over time on the credibility of threats to sueHarvard Law School1996-01-01
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Corporate ownershiip [sic] structuresprivate versus social optimalityHarvard Law School1996-01-01
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Negative expected value suitsHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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The effect of offer-of-settlement rules on the terms of settlementHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcyfurther thoughts and a reply to criticsHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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Concentration in the Israeli economy and bank investment in nonfinancial companiesHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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Chapter 11Harvard Law School1997-01-01
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Chapter 11National Bureau of Economic Research1998-01-01
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Negative expected value suitsNational Bureau of Economic Research1998-01-01
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The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcyfurther thoughts and a reply to criticsNational Bureau of Economic Research1998-01-01
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An economic analysis of transnational bankruptciesNational Bureau of Economic Research1998-01-01
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The 'Lemons Effect' in corporate freeze-outsHarvard Law School1998-01-01
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The effect of offer-of-settlement rules on the terms of settlementNational Bureau of Economic Research1998-01-01
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Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equitythe creation and agency costs of separating control from cash flow rightsNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governanceSchool of Law, Stanford University1999-01-01
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The "lemons effect" in corporate freeze-outsNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and controlHarvard Law School1999-01-01
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Managerial value diversion and shareholder wealthNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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Reconsidering contractual liability and the incentive to reveal informationNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governanceHarvard Law School1999-01-01
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Federalism and takeover lawthe race to protect managers from takeoversNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and controlNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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Federalism and takeover lawthe race to protect managers from takeoversHarvard Law School1999-01-01
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Using options to divide value in corporate bankruptcyNational Bureau of Economic Research2000-01-01
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A new approach to takeover law and regulatory competitionHarvard Law School2000-01-01
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Executive compensation in Americaoptimal contracting or extraction of rents?National Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
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A new approach to valuing secured claims in bankruptcyHarvard Law School2001-01-01
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Pre-contractual relianceNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
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Federal intervention to enhance shareholder choiceHarvard Law School2001-01-01
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Property rights and liability rulesthe ex ante view of the cathedralHarvard Law School2001-01-01
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Takeover bids vs. proxy fights in contests for corporate controlNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
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Precontractual relianceUniversity of Chicago Press2001-01-01
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A new approach to valuing secured claims in bankruptcyNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
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Ex ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcyNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
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A new approach to takeover law and regulatory competitionNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
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The overlooked corporate finance problems of a Microsoft breakupNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
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Executive compensation in Americaoptimal contracting or extraction of rents?Harvard Law School2001-01-01
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Imperfect competition and agency problems in the market for corporate lawLaw and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto2001-01-01
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Vigorous race or leisurely walkreconsidering the debate on state compensation over corporate chartersYale Law Journal Co.2002-01-01
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Does the evidence favor state competition in corporate law?The John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard Law School2002-01-01
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Does the evidence favor state competition in corporate law?National Bureau of Economic Research2002-01-01
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Asymmetric information and the choice of corporate governance arrangementsHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Optimal defaults for corporate law evolutionNational Bureau of Economic Research2002-01-01
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On takeover law and regulatory competitionHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boardstheory, evidence and policyNational Bureau of Economic Research2002-01-01
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The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boardsfurther findings and a reply to symposium participantsSchool of Law, Stanford University2002-01-01
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Firms' decisions where to incorporateNational Bureau of Economic Research2002-01-01
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Takeover bids vs. proxy fights in contests for corporate controlHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boardstheory, evidence, and policyHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Ex ante investments and ex post externalitiesHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Misreporting corporate performanceHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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The case against board veto in corporate takeoversNational Bureau of Economic Research2002-01-01
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Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensationNational Bureau of Economic Research2002-01-01
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The questionable case for using auctions to select lead counselHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Firms' decisions where to incorporateHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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The trouble with staggered boardsa reply to Georgeson's John WilcoxHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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The case for shareholder access to the ballotAmerican Bar Association2003-01-01
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Firms' decisions where to incorporateUniversity of Chicago2003-01-01
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Why firms adopt antitakeover arrangementsNational Bureau of Economic Research2003-01-01
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Executive compensation as an agency problemNational Bureau of Economic Research2003-01-01
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Executive compensation as an agency problemHarvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business2003-01-01
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Why firms adopt antitakeover arrangementsUniversity of Pennsylvania Law School2003-01-01
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Shareholder access to the ballotHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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The case for increasing shareholder powerHarvard Law School2004-01-01
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The costs of entrenched boardsHarvard Law School2004-01-01
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The costs of entrenched boardsNational Bureau of Economic Research2004-01-01
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Stealth compensation via retirement benefitsHarvard Law School2004-01-01
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Stealth compensation via retirement benefitsNational Bureau of Economic Research2004-01-01
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Designing a shareholder access ruleHarvard Law School2004-01-01
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What matters in corporate governance?Harvard Law School2004-01-01
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The growth of executive payNational Bureau of Economic Research2005-01-01
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The Business Roundtable's untenable case against shareholder accessHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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One-sided contracts in competitive consumer marketsHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Pay without performanceoverview of the issuesHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Executive pensionsNational Bureau of Economic Research2005-01-01
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Putting executive pensions on the radar screenHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Liability for accidentsHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Specific performance versus damages for breach of contractHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Firm expansion and ceo payHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Executive compensation at Fannie Maea case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflageHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Is breach of contract immoral?Harvard Law School2005-01-01
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The growth of executive payHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Pay without perfomanceoverview of the issuesHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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The case for increasing shareholder powerHarvard Law Review Association2005-01-01
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Pay distribution in the top executive teamHarvard Law School2006-01-01
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Lucky directorsNational Bureau of Economic Research2006-01-01
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Lucky CEOsNational Bureau of Economic Research2006-01-01
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Towards a true corporate republica traditionalist response to Lucian's solution for improving corporate AmericaHarvard Law School2006-01-01
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Replyletting shareholders set the rulesHarvard Law Review Association2006-01-01
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Lucky directorsHarvard Law School2006-01-01
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The Myth of the shareholder franchiseHarvard Law School2006-01-01
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Federal corporate lawlessons from historyHarvard Law School2006-01-01
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The myth of the shareholder franchiseVirginia Law Review association2007-01-01
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Investor protection and interest group politicsHarvard Law School2007-01-01
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Ceo centralityHarvard Law School2007-01-01
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A plan for addressing the financial crisisHarvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business2008-01-01
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The state of corporate governance researchHarvard Law School2009-01-01
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The state of corporate governance researchHarvard Law School2009-01-01
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Negative-expected-value suitsHarvard Law School2009-01-01
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The wages of failureexecutive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 20000-2008Harvard Law School2009-01-01
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Private ordering and the proxy access debateHarvard Law School2009-01-01
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Paying for long-term performanceHarvard Law School2009-01-01
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Regulating bankers' payHarvard Law School2009-01-01
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How to fix bankers' payHarvard Law School2010-01-01
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The CEO pay sliceHarvard Law School2010-01-01
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Bundling and entrenchmentHarvard Law School2010-01-01
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Self-fulfilling credit market freezesNational Bureau of Economic Research2010-01-01
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Learning and the disappearing association between governance and returnsHarvard Law School2010-01-01
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How to fix bankers' payHarvard Law School2010-01-01
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Golden parachutes and the wealth of shareholdersHarvard Law School2010-01-01
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Learning and the disappearing association between governance and returnsNational Bureau of Economic Research2010-01-01
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Corporate political speechwho decides?Harvard Law School2010-01-01
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Staggered boards and the wealth of shareholdersevidence from two natural experimentsHarvard Law School2011-01-01
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業績連動型報酬の虛実Amerika no yakuin hōshū to kōporēto kabanansuDaigaku Kyōiku Shuppan2013-01-01
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Litigation and settlement under imperfect informationLaw and Economics Program, Stanford Law School